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THE OOURSE OF THE FRONT
A PART from the Finnish front, onwhich no large-scale fighting hastaken place for tile last eighteen
months, the Eastern Front consisted of
two sectors when the winter of 1942/43
set in on the wide plains of Eastern
Europe (see maps on pp. 324 and 331).
The northern sector stretched from
Lake Ladoga to Oryol: along the River
Volkhov to Lake TImen, southeastward
to the strongly fortified prong of Dem-
yanak, in a wide curve towards the west,
leading elose by Velilriye Luki to the
equally strongly fortified town of Rjev,
and east of the railway line RjevfVyazma/
Brya.nsk to Oryol. On this northern
sector the front had become stabilized
during the winter of 1941/42. The So-
viets had attempted here to relieve en-
circled Leningrad and to destroy the"
jutting Ger~an salients of Demyansk
and Rjev; but, in spite of frequent and
sometimes severe battles, the war had
turned into positional warfare, aud both
sides had had enough timo to fortify
their strongholds.
The southern sector of the front ran,
in the middle of November 1942, from
Oryol to Voronej, then along the Don
to the easternmost point of its great
bend, acl'088 the DonfVolga isthmus to
the Volga north of Stalingrad, then from
a point south of this city through the
Kalmnck steppes to the central Caucasus
near Ordjonikidze and westward along
the northern slopes of the Caucasus to
the Black Sea at Tuapse. This southern
sector was the result of the European
offensive in the summer of 1942. Con-
sequently, the front here did not have
the stable character of the northern
seotor. With its length of approximately
2,000 kilometers as the crow flies, this
new front was three times as long as it
had been before the commencement of
the summer offensive of 1942, when the
southern front ran in an almost straight
line from Oryol to Taganrog on the Sea
of Azov, mainly along the Doneta and
Mius Rivers.
TWO FACTS FOR "MOSOOW
The problem occnpying the minds of
the world in November 1942 was: what
shape would the war on tho Eastern
Front assume during the winter? The
deliborations on the part of the Soviet
a.nd European High Commands were
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not known at that time; however, in
16lOking back on the events of the past
winter, they can be reconstructed.
Moscow's decision was the result of
two facts:
(1) The territory conquered in southern
Russia and the northern Caucasus by
the European armies in the summer of
1942 included rich agricultural soil and
important industries. Moreover, the loss
of it robbed the Soviet Union of nine
tenths of its routes of communication
between the Caucasus and the rest of
the Soviet Union and, since the capture
of the greater part of Stalingrad, also of
the use of the Russian life line, the Volga.
It was of the utmost importimce for
Moscow to regain these regions and at
least part of those lost in the first sum·
mer of the war as soon 808 poBBible.
(2) The Red Army had suffered devas-
tating blows during the two summers of
1941 and 1942. In addition to many
millions of men, it had lost millions of
square kilometers of land. Its own of-
fensives, which it had carried out in the
summer of 1942-a.t Kertch and at
Kharkov-had very soon ended in catas-
trophe. But the experiences of winter
had been different. The sudden on·
slaught of unusual cold had caused the
German troops, which had penetrated
nearly to Moscow in the autumn of 1941,
to withdraw to the line RjevJOryol. In
addition to this, the Red Army had, by
making use of the winter so familiar to
them, been able to make some dents in
the German front, especially the deep
bulge of Toropets. According to the
experiences of the first war winter, the
Soviet High Command could count on
part of the German armies being with-
drawn from the front during the second
winter too, in order to recuperate from
the exertions of the great summer offen·
sive, to be re-formed, trained in the us~
of new arms, and prepared for new ac-
tions in the summer of 1943.
The necessity of regaining as much as
possiBle of the lost territory, and the fact
that winter otIered the only chance of
accomplishing this, f0rced the Reds to
undertake a winter offensive at any
cost.
THE RED PLAN
Hence, Stalin, as early 808 the spring
of 1942, placed his hopes in a great Soviet
offensive in the winter of 1942. The
entire resources of the vaat part of the
USSR still remaining in his hands were
placed at the service of preparing an
offensive which, synchronized with the
establishment of a second front in Europe,
was to put all the offensives ever known
in history into the shade and-as Stalin
had given to expect in his order of May
1, 1942-was, in the course of that
year, to lead to the "final annihilation
of the German-Fascist armies and the
liberation of the Soviet soil."
In a total mobilization such as had
never been carried out anywhere else
before, every able-bodied man W88 put
into the Red Army. Boys, women, and
old men were mobilized for industry and
agriculture, and everything that did not
directly serve the war effort was ruthless-
ly abandoned to starvation and ruin.
It was not until the autumn and on
the Volga that the Red Army managed
to stop the victorious march of the
German and allied armies. But even at
that time it had its eye mainly on its
winter offensive. All through 1942, mil-
lions of soldiers from the whole vast
empire, even from the ranks of the Far
Eastern Army, streamed into the regions
east of the front between Lake Ladoga
and the Caspian Sea. The Soviet in-
dustry threw all its human and material
reserves into the production of tanks,
planes, and other war material. As a
result of the experiences of the first war
winter, special attention was paid to the
development of winter arms. Ski troops
wore trained, tanks were fixed up for
.the winter, cannons were mounted Oll
sleighs moved by propellers, and all
available horses were brought to the
front. Perhaps one can even go so far
as to say that Moscow regarded the first
war winter with its large number of minor
and middle-sized engagements 808 a school
for the Red Army, to teach it offensive
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operations under winter conditiom after
a thousand miles of demoralizing retreats.
When the last winter started, Stalin
hoped, with his gigantic human and ma-
terial forces, not only to reconquer the
territory lost in the summer of 1942 and
to doprive the European armies of their
winter rest, but to break the whole
German front and to throw it far back.
GERMAN AIMS A.ND MEANS
In order to understand the st,rategy of
the German armies during the last win-
ter, an elementary military law should be
remembered, namely, to employ one's
strong arm and hold back the weaker one.
Germany's strong arm is the spirit, lead-
ership, maneuverability, and technical
equipment of her armies, her weaker one
her limitation in man power, or-to put
it differently-her wise determination to
economize with her human resow·ces.
Throughout this war the German strategy
has been the more successful the more it
followed this maxim.
As fa.r as the attitude of the German
High Command towards the winter of
1942/43 is concerned, Berlin has, as usual,
been very reticent. We shall, however,
attempt to answer this question by recall-
ing the nature of the European war
against the Soviet Union.
Bolshevism had torn Russia a.way from
Europe in every respect-spiritual, po-
litical, and economic-and had made her
a menace to the non-Bolshevist world.
Tho gOld of the present war is to bring
back Eastern Europe into the fold
of European nations-spiritually and
politically, so that the constant threat in
the rear of Europe may disappear; and
economically, so that the fooo- and raw-
material basis of, Europe may suffice,
not only for the victorious conclusion of
the present war, but also for the recon-
struction of the Europe of tomorrow.
Theoretically, there are three meam of
achieving this goal. The first is a change
in the domestic political situation in the
Soviet Union, which would bring forces
to the fore that were favorably inclined
towards the new Europe; the second,
the expulsion of the Red Army from
Europe; and the third, the annihilation of
the Red Army.
The first method would be the most
advantageous one. But it is too early
to reckon with yet, although there
are signs pointing in this direction,
as is shown by the case of General
Vlassov. Twenty-five years of Bolshevist
terror and propaganda have placed serious
obstacles in the way of a. quick inner
change among the Soviet population.
GERMANY'S ALTERNATIVES
In favor of the second method, the ex·
pulsion of the Rod Army from Europe,
it could be said that it is easier to drive
off an army than to destroy it. But the
vast area represented by the Soviet
Union speaks agaimt this solution. Il,
for instance, the Red Army were forced
back to the Urals without being de-
stroyed, this would necessitate the main-
tenance of a European army of protection
at the Urals, more than 2,000 kilometers
from East Prussia and 4,000 kilometers
from the defenses of the west coast of
Europe. Furthermore, the events of the
two summers of 1941 and 1942 had shown
that the possibilities offered by the second
method were limited. In both summers
the Red Army had been thrown back
over huge distances. Nevertheless, the
USSR and its resorves of strength were
so great that at the end of summer-1941
before Moscow and 1942 at Stalingrad-
the Red Army still had enough strength
to offer comiderable resistance. The two
European summer offellBives had inflicted
upon the Soviet Union the loss of in-
dustrial regions, agricultural soil, mineral
resources, and routes of oommunication;
but they had not removed the threat of
the Red Army and Bolshevism to Europe.
Thus the third method, that of anni-
hilating as large parts as possible of the
Red Army, offered the greatest practical
prospects of success. The destruction of
this chief instrument of the Soviet Union
and of World Bolshevism would free the
peoples living in the Soviet Union from
the yoke of Bolshevism and Europe from
its nightmare. Moscow itself considers
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the danger arising from a destruction of
the Red Army as far more serious than
that caused by the loss of territory.
This is evident from the fact that, since
the annihilation of Timoshenko's army at
Kharkov in May I Q42, the Russian com-
mand has done all in its power to preserve
its armies from destruction, even at the
cost of giving up such vast and important
areas as the Don Bend and the Kuban
territory.
THE TASK FOR THE 'VINTER
In employing this third method, the
German command was faced in the winter
of 1942/43 with the task of destroying as
many Red troops as possible. Preferably
this was to take place in an area not too
far east, that is, not too far from the
European centers of strength, since the
difficulties of transport increased with
every kilometer, nor, on the other hand,
so far west as to endanger the rehabilita-
tion of Eastern Europe. In view of tllis,
the German High Command stopped its
offensive one and a half months earlier
last autumn than in the autumn of
1941 and prepared its armies to carry on
a defensive war during the winter. Ex-
pecting as it did a very powerful Soviet
offensive, the German High Command was
ready gradually to take back, with the
least possible German losses and the
largest possible enemy losses, the front
that had been pushed almost to the
borders of .Asia during the summer of
1942. The divisions freed by this short-
ening of the front could then be employed
to reinforce the reserves available for
strategic use.
The disadvantage of such a maneuver
lay in the fact that it would return to
the enemy the important rcrutes of com·
munication-railways and rivers, especial-
ly the Volga-which he had lost in the
summer of 1942. But there was one
possibility, which we shall discuss in
detail, of postponing this disadvantage as
long as possible: Stalingrad.
Another disadvantage, namely, that
the surrender of the territory conquered
in 1942 would return e~-tensive industrial
and agricultw'al regions to the Soviet
Union, was of minor importance. In
carrying out their brutal "scorched earth"
policy, the Soviets had done more than
their Rhare to render the territory evac-
uated by thorn unserviceable for some
time to come. Moreover, a part of the
popula.tion had been carried off during
the retreat of the Red Army; another
part was sure to follow the evacuating
German troops. (Wo know now that it
did, thus passing a mute vote of non-
confidence for the advancing Bolsheviks.)
Thus the Soviets would gain little agri-
cultural and industrial profit from the
reoccupation of a region across which
the flood of war had rolled twice.
Neither from the fields of the Don
and Kuban area nor from the faoto-
ries of the eastern Donbass could the
Soviets expeot any notable production
for 1943, to say nothing of the most
important armament center of southern
Russia, Stalingrad, which lay in ruins.
MOBlldTY IN WTNTER
On the basis of experience gained by
the German Army during the first Russian
war winter, extensive and systematic
preparations were made as early as the
spring of 1942 for the warfare in the
second war winter. Since the expected
Red winter offensive pointed to a war
of movement and not to a positional war,
it was essential, in the field of clothing
as well as that of housing, to take into
account the demands of a war of move-
ment under tho most difficult winter
conditions.
.After manifold experiments-in arti-
ficial cold chambers and wind channels
as well as under actual front-line condi-
tions-the mass production of quilted
uniforms was commenced on April 29,
1942. These uniforms were made of
three layers of cloth padded with wool.
The seams did not lie one on top of tho
other, which helped to prevent the wind
from penetrating; the outer layers were
impregnated; the trousers were also
quilted, and the boots had double shafts
permitting the wearer to stuff the inter-
vening space with straw or paper; the
head was protected by a special head
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proteotor and the face by a mask; the
stool helmet was covered by a hood.
In this way, a maximum of protection
against \\ind and oold was aohieved, as
well as a ma)\.imum of mobility.
In order to render the troops mobile
nnd as independent as possible of towns
and villagos-which ""re especially ex-
posed to bombings and artillery attacks-
the question of winter shelter was studied
systematically. Where there was enough
snow, snow huts such as had formerly
been used only on polar expeditions
proved suitable. In addition to this,
tents made of wind-proof impregnated
material, heated by portable stoves, were
manufactured iii Vatlt numbers.
To keep communications open, in-
numerable snowplows were brought up
to or behind the front, and the engines
of motor vehicles were
made resistant against
cold. For movements
between the main routes,
hundreds of thousands
of pairs of skis and count-
less sleighs were provided,
among whioh latter the
boat-shaped Finnish Akja
sleigh, which can easily
be pulled by two or
three men and yet move
fairly heavy loads, proved
especially useful.
In this way, the
months of October and
November, in which no large offonsive
operations took. place, were used by the
German side for systematic preparations
against the Soviet winter offensive.
FOUR DRIVES AGAINST STALINGRAD
On November 20, 1942, began the
Soviet offensive in the Stalingrad area
and, moreover, simultaneously from four
sides: from the north and the south against
the two German barrier posit.ions; from the
west (from the Don Loop); and from the
east across the Volga (in co-operat.ion
wit,h the Red troops still holding out in
one district of Stalingr,w).
The attack against the northern barrier
position bogged down at first. Here the
German positions were particularly strong.
Severe Bolshevist attacks direoted at
relieving Stalingrad had already been
repulsed by thorn for months, and a
mighty German defense system had grad-
ually been established all across the
entire Don/Volga isthmus north of Stalin-
grad.
The Soviet thrust within the Don Loop
was more successful. In the northeastern
corner of this loop, in the area of Sera-
fimovitch, the Red Army had managed
to retain a bridgehead on the right bank
of the Don, and it was from here that
they now advanced into the upper Tohir
valley. Alter some initial successes, this
thrust was brought to a halt by the
Axis troops before it had reached the
railway line LikhayajStalingrad.
The attack from with-
in the oity of Stalingrad
remained without in-
fiuance on the course of





thrust came from the
south. Long in advance,
the Red Army had con-
centrated troops and
weapons here to the
south of the German
barrier position. These troops and sup-
plies had been brought in part across the
Volga and in part from the Kalmuck
steppes on the lower reaches of tho
Volga and the Caspian Sea. With this
army, which was much stronger than
could have been expected in view of the
difficult transport conditions in this reo
gion, the Reds made their main thrust
against the defense system of Stalingrad.
It was a thrust that, as has not been
denied by the German side, possessed
an indisputable surprise effect.
"ith incredible ruthlessness towards
the lives of their own men-in the first
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two days, 5 Soviet infantry divisions
and somo 1,000 tanks were sacrificed-
the Reds succeeded in breaking through
the southern barrier position and in
advancing across the railway lines Stalin-
grad/Salsk and Stalingrad/Likhaya. up
to the eastern bank of the Don Loop.
The importance of this break-through
lay in the fact tha.t it cut the only two
railway lines which connected the German
army in Stalingrad with the re8t of the
Gorman forces.
The German command was now faced
by the decision: should it order the
German and allied troops in and around
Stalingrad to hold out, or 8hould it order
them to fight their way back we8tward
to the bulk of the European armies1
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That the latter alternative would have
still been possible at tha.t time can .be
safely assumed with an army which
proved in the course of the next two
months that it was ca.pable of enormous
aohievements.
THE GERMAN DECISION
As became clearly apparent in the
oourse of the winter war, Stalingrad held
the key position in the entire Red plan
of offensive. Stalingrad is the junction
of six important lines of communication,
viz., the railways StalingradfMoscow,
Stalingrad jLikhaya/Kharkov, Stalingradj
SalskjCauc&Sus, and Stalingrad (or Kras-
naya Sloboda on the east bank of the
Volga)jCaspian SeafUrals, as well as the
river routes up the Volga to central
Russia and down the Volga to the Cas-
pian Sea. While Stalingrad was in the
hands of the European armies, there
was no rail connection between the bulk
of the Soviet Army and the Red armies
in the Caucasus, apart from a new line
SaratovjAstrakhan/Kizlyar. As long as
the German flag waved over Stalingrad ,
the Soviet masses could, it is true, batter
against the German fronts and perhaps
even dent them here and there, but they
could not oarry out any really large-scale
operations. In spite of all the motoriza-
tion effected by the Red Army for many
years, the railway lines have remained
the backbone of military operations,
especially during the winter.
Sta.lingrad had lost its importance as
a city and center of industry, owing to its
almost complete destruction. Since,
moreover, the Volga froze over anyway
in November, there was no necessity, at
least during the winter, for maintaining
a German army on its banks in order to
prevent the transportation of oi.l a~d
other war-essentia.l goods on this life
line. It was Stalingrad's significance as
a railway junction which determined the
German command to hold Stalingrad as
long as possible.
THE SIXTH ARMY
This difficult and honorable task was
entrusted to the German Sixth Army
under General Paulus, which also oon-
tained two Rumanian divisions, one Croat
regiment, and one battalion of Turkestan
volunteers.
No official German figures have boon
released regarding the total number of
the defenders of Stalingrad. In their
communique of January 17, the Soviets
mentioned the figure of "200,000 to
220,000," a figure which they later at-
tempted even to increase. In view of
the understandable desire of the Soviets
to make their success appear as great
&8 possible, and in view of the notorio.us
unreliability of their propaganda, partlC-
ularly where figures are concerned, it is
safe to assume that the actnal number
was far below that named by the Soviets.
When the Sixth Army received
orders to remain in Stalingrad and not
to attempt to fight its way bac~.
the German High Command obVl-
ously reckoned on relieving the cut-
off troops. The fact that the Soviet
propaganda did not begin to mentio~
the isolation of the Sixth Army untl1
weeks later shows that the Soviets also
counted on this. On several previous
occasions they had already made the
experionce that out-off German troops
wore finally relieved, sometimes only
after months.
"KHOLM TACTICS"
Perhaps it is permissible to coin the
term "Kholm tactics" for a new concep-
tion of military science whioh first proved
its worth in the winter of 1941j42 at
Kholm. These tactics grew out of the
fact that in the present war, in contrast
to that of 1914j17, the German Eastern
Frontdoos not consist of one uninterrupted
line of trenches, but rather of a chain of
powerful stronghoTds of varying size with
relatively weak defenses betwoon them.
III these gaps the enemy may be able to
break through, 88 he did in the first war
winter between Demyansk and Rjev.
But as long as the strongholds are in the
defe'nder's hands, the attacker remains
seriol18ly menaced in his rear.
The 8UCceSS of the Kholm tactics de-
pends on the defender's ability to 8UPP~Y
his strongholds, preferably by land, 88 10
the cases of DemyaD8k and Rjev. But
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Kholm has proved that even the complete
encirclement of a stronghold is not fatal
as long as the front is not too far away
and the stronghold can be supplied by
air. The Kholm tn,ctics, although in-
volving risks, as does every kind of war-
fare, had not failed up to Stalingrad, and
we are inclined to believe that the Ger- .
Dlan High Command at first considered
'talingrad in the same light. Thus, while
the Germans within the city continued the
battle against those districts still in
Soviet hands, Lt strong German detachment
advanced along the line Sa.lsk/Stalingrad
in order to re-establish connections with
tho Sixth Army.
On December 14 this detachment com-
menced its attack in tho area of Kotel-
nikovo and forced hack the Re"d troops
located thoro towards Stalingm,d. In the
Tchir valley, too, the German troops
otIered stubborn and succe.sful resistance
in order to prevent the Red armies pross-
ing from the north from reaching the
railway. I imultanoously, n.1l tho other
sectors of the long Eastern Front were
successfully held against Rod attacks,
which were in part very severe and of
which more will be said later.
THE BREAK-THROUGH AT BOGUTORAR
At this moment-on December 20,
exactly one month after the commence-
ment of the winter offensive--the Rod
troops broke through in the region of
Bogutchar on the middle Don, about
halfway between Voronej and the Don
Bend. By using tremendous forces and
making terrible sacrifices, the Red Army
succeeded in the ensuing days in cutting
the railway Voronej/Rostov Itt Kan-
temirovka and, moreover, by rolling on
southward through tho valley of the
Kalitva, in crossing the railway Likhay$\./
Stalingrad at Tatsinskaya and in thrusting
on towards the lower Don.
In answering the question of how it
was possible for such a break-through to
occur, we must bear in mind that
the European Eastern Front had been
thinned out considerably during tho win-
ter in order to give part of the troops a
rest and new training in regions far
behind tho front. Another factor was
that in the moantime tho mighty Don
had frozen over firmly and had thus
lost its character of natural defonse of
tho left flank of the German Southern
Army. All of Russia, norma.lly divided
up by numerous rivers and marshes, had
once again become, as in every winter,
one vast plain with no natural obstacles.
The chief explanation for the Soviets·
success is to be found in the enormous
mass of men and material employed by
them and the rutWessness with which
this was done. Nobody had been more
consistent in warning the world of the
danger which Bulshevism presented to it
than the leaders of the Reich, but even
they have admitted more than once that
thoy had greatly undorestimated the
actual strongth of the USSR.
All this does not alter the fact that
the Soviets had found the right place for
a break-through bere and had oarried it
out correctly. AJthough their attack
bogged down soon, the prong which the
Soviets had driven into the flank of the
Southern Army represented a threat to
tho entire Southern Army. The Bol-
sheviks were now dangerously near
Likhaya and Rostov, the two railway
junctions which were indispensable 88
supply centers of the German Southern
Army.
THE MEN OF STALINGRAD
The break-through at Bogutchar caused
the Fiihrer, with whom the final word rests
in a.1l vitally important. oases, to come to
three decisions: (I) to give up the at-
tempt of relieving Stalingrad and to take
baok the troops from the Don Loop as
well as from the area Salsk/Kotelnikovo;
(2) to withdraw the North Caucasus army
now entirely; and (3) to leave the Sixt,h
Army in Stalingrad to cover thoso movo-
ments.
This soaled the fate of the Sixth Army
and now bogan its heroic strugglo at a
lost post.
While the thunder of the cannons of
the relieving army at Aksai drew further
and further off and finally died away.
while the front of tho German Southern
THE WINTER WAR 327
Army moved day by day further west
from Stalingrad-during the last days of
the defense of Stalingrad it was 250
kilometers away-and while the chances
of ever a,gain seeing their country dis-
appeared entirely for the men of Stalin-
grad, they remained at their posts at the
outer edge of Europe. Every one of them
knew that he was now faood only by
death or terrible captivity. He knew
that for him there was no way out to
freedom. But he also kne'" that every day
of holding out was needed to enable his
comrades still standing in the region be-
twoon the lower Don and the Caucasus to
return to the bulk of the army and thus to
oontribute to the finlLI victory of his
people. Knowing all this, he decided to
sacrifice himself for his comrades and his
nation, to do his duty to the bitter end,
and to sell his life as dearly as possible.
What took place in the ensuing weeke
on the banks of the Volga is a unique
event in history. It was unique, not
because of the size of the army which
was destroyed here, for tho Sixth Army
was smaller than anyone of a dozen
Red armies which had been oncircled by
German troops in the course of the war.
(Not counting dead, the Soviets lost in
prisoners alone-each time within a few
days-in the three battles of Byalystokl
Minsk, Kiev, and Kharkov a total of
1.2 million men.) It was unique in that
here in Stalingrad a whole army, from
the fiold marshal down to the last army
clerk, held out to the last, on foreign
soil, cut off from the rest of the army,
and without hope of relief.
RED A.."'iD WHITE
During the past winter, Soviet prop-
aganda has done a lot of boasting and
made every effort to inflate the successes
of the Red Army and make them appear
as large as possible in the eyes of the
world. But even the Soviet reports on
the battle of Stalingrad had to admit
that the Sixth Army fought to the last
moment and that the final survivors did
not surrender till, half starved and
frozen, they had come to the end of their
ammunition and had nothing but their
bare hands with which to oppose Soviet
tanks.
Since November 20, 1942, almost a
million Red soldiers from six Sovi6t
armies, with thousands of tanks, had
been hurling themselves against the Sixth
Army. The northern barrier position
alone was attacked by five Red armored
divisions and numerous infantry divi-
sions. Day and night the Red flood was
tossed against the breakwater of Stalin-
grad, and its dead covered the steppe.
All this took place in the Russian
winter, while snowstorms, breaking
through the gateway between the Urals
and the Caucasus, raged from Siberia
across the level steppes, and while men,
who could find hardly a stick to burn in
the treeless steppe and ruined Stalingrad,
fought without pause, day and night,
against Red death as well as white.
Thousands of tons of steel descended
upon them. But wherever a Soviet
thrust broke through, hedgehog poeitions
were formed in its rear, sometimes by
large detachments and sometimes by a
fow men only-nuclouscs of heroic re-
sistance, every single one of which had to
be destroyed with heavy sacrifices for
the Reds.
THE SOVIETS SUGGEST SURRENDD
So tremendous were the l0880S suffered
by the Soviets that the Red High Com-
mand decided to propose a cessation of
hostilities to the survivors of the Sixth
Army. According to Soviet reports this
proposal was worded as follows :
To t.he Commander of t.he German Sixth AnDy.
Colonel·General Paulus. or his deputy or Uldtant,
and to the entire offioera' corps, and rank·and·fiJe
01 the aurrounded German troope near Stalingrad:
The unite of t.he Red Army have encircled this
group of the German Army by a firm ring. All
hopCl8 for the salvation of your troope by an offen·
sive of the German troops from the ROUth or 8Outh·
WCOIt. have proved futile .••• The German. t.nlDII.
port aviation is au1Jering enormous I~ ~ ~.
chinee and pel'llOnneJ from the R_ aViatIon.
Therefore, the attempte to reecue )'our group
cannot be realized.
The posit.ion of your aurrounded troops ia very
difficult. Your troope are auftering from hunger,
cold, and m-. The cold Ruaian winter ia
only beginning. Fro8ta aDd atroog winds are
.till ahead. Your troops. which have no winter
clothing. are living in very dUIlcult and UIllaDitary
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conditioM. You, sa their commander. and aU
the German officers realize perfectly well that. you
have no real po88ibility of breaking through the
ring of our encirclement. Your position is hope.
Ie., and your further resistanoe would be abeolutely
......
Under weh conditioDll and with a view to avoid·
ing ...ee1-e bl<><>dah«l. we propoee that you aooept.
the following conditioDll of capitulation:
(1) All the aurrounded German troope headed
by you and your stafta are to oeaae rai.ItaDoo.
(2) You are to band over to ua, in an orpnized
1DUU18I', the entire penoDDeI of your surrounded
group, it. eotire equipmeot, and aU the w.-pone
of war, in full order.
We guaruatoee to all th~ who will oeue reo
aiat-anOCt--6ll oftloen and .aldiera-lile and MIety,
and. after the termination of the war, their return
to Oermauy or any other oountry they would wish
to eoter.
We Ihall Jean to all thoee aurrende:ring to our
troope t.heir military UDiform, their badges and
medaJa, and all their penooal belonlinp, while the
om-. will be allcnred to keep their cold weapons.
.A1l t.be aurrende:ring oflloera, NCO'.. and eoldien•
.ball .-ive normal nouriahmeot. Medioal aid
Ihall be liveo to aU sick men. to all f~bittenand
wounded.
Your reply is expected at 10 o'clock exactly,
on January 9, 1943. Moeoow time. in writing••••
We warn you that, in the event of your refual
to capitulate. the troope of the Red Army and
Red Air Faroe ahall have to annibiJat. the aur.
rounded German troope. and you Ihall be reo
8pODsibJe for their complete annihilation
This was on January 8, when German
troops were still fighting between Salsk
and Kotelnikovo and in the area Prokh-
ladnenskY/Georgyevsk (northern Cau-
caaus) and still required several weeks to
withdraw entirely into the Donete area.
THE SIXTH ARMY REPLIES
The aJl8wer to this ultimatum was a
proud "No."
The battle continued for another
twenty-five days. Again wave after wave
of the Red flood dashed against the Sixth
Army, which was being pressed into a
continually diminishing spaCe. German
planes still came day and night as the
sole connection with the main force of
the army, to bring ammunition, food,
and spare parts and to take away the
severely wounded-47,OOO in all, as Ber-
lin later announced. (To appreciate this
huge fi~ one might point out that it is
one and a half times that of the total
number of Australia's air passengers in
a whole year.) They flew under the
most difficult conditions, constantly
risking their lives, for there were no
airfields to land on, only the storm-
whipped, snow-covered steppe, torn into
shreds by bomb craters. . . until the day
came, in the middle of January, when
the German planes, looking in vain for
even the smallest place to land, circled
over Stalingrad and flew off again.
Even then the Sixth Army continued to
fight for another two weeks. Not until
the last day of January, at 7.15 a.m.•
were the last radio reports sent out
from the headquarters of General Paulus.
They ran: •'The Bolaheviks are attacking
headquarters with superior forces. We
must destroy the radio station." And
shortly afterwards: "Headquarters have
ceased to function. Heil Fuhrer."
What happened after that is known
only from Soviet descriptions. General
Paulus himself, who had been promoted to
the rank of Field Marshal by the FUhrer a
few days earlier, was not taken prieoner
until the whole house which had been his
headquarters was occupied and his guards
were dead. In full uniform, said the
Soviet report, he started on his way into
imprisonment. He knew that the sur-
vivors of his army needed their leader in
captivity no less than in battle.
The northern group of the Sixth Army,
under General Strecker, still continued
its battle in the Dzorjinsky tractor works
of Stalingrad. For them the end came
on February 2.
THE GERMAN NATION REPLIES
The answer given by the German na-
tion to Stalingrad came at once. It was
twofold. The special communique of the
Fuhrer's headquarters which announced
the end of the Sixth Army closed with
the words: "Divisions are already being
formed for a new Sixth Army."
At the same time, the law concerning
total mobilization was decreed. Accord-
ing to this law, all men from 16 to 65
and all women from 17 to 45 living within
the territory of the German Reich must
report for work to strengthen the effort
of the home front: first, in order to in-
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crease war production to the utmost, and
8OO0ndly, in order to free as many able-
bodied men as possible for the front.
In addition to this, the Reich Minister
for Economics decreed that aU commercial
enterprises, shops, restaurants, and" hotels
not urgently needed by the war industry
<>r for supplying the population, as well
as all places of entertainment, bars, and
luxury restaurants, must be closed. These
measures, which mean hardship for many
individuals, will free additional millions
of people for war purposes. With the
disa.ppearance of the last traces of peace-
time life, the whole German nation has
become one concentrated body of energy
directed at a. single goal, that of victory.
Thus the sacrifice of the Sixth Army
enabled the German oommand to oarry
out its program on the southern front
and to withdraw the other German armies.
At the same time, it has fired the
German people to a still greater willing-
no 8 for self-sacrifice.
BET\VEEN DO~ AND CAUOASUS
Shielded by the Sixth Army, the
evacuation of the regions conquered in
the summer of 1942 was meanwhile
carried out. The European army stand-
ing north of the Caucasus and known as
the Seventeenth Army had been exposed
since the end of November to severe Red
attacks, particularly along the Terok
River and in the district of Alagir in the
<lentral Caucasus as well as at Tuapso on
the Black Sea. While part of the Ger-
man troops took up barrier positions,
the withdmwal of the German and allied
army took place, partly to the bridge-
head on the lower Kuban but mainly
via Rostov into the Donets area. In
spite of aU efforts, the Red Army was
not able to disturb tJlls process. On
March 19, 1943, a Shanghai Soviet paper
stated that approximately fifty German
and allied divisions had been drawn off
from the northern Caucasus territory.
We doubt whether the European army
there was as big as this, since large-scale
operations had already ceased by the
beginning of October 1942. Moreover,
.as a result of the natural protection of
the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the
Kalmuck steppes, as well as the friendly
attitude of the mountain population and
the Cossacks, large numbers were not
required. Nevertheless, this statement
on the part of the Soviets is interesting
as it indirectly confirms the undisturbed
withdrawal of the Seventeenth Army.
The North CallCUlII Yroot
On January 3 began the withdrawal of
the rearguardB from the Caucasian bar-
rier positions. Within one month, almost
the entire territory up to the Don had
been evacuated. Real fighting did not
start until the crossing of the Don before
Rostov and on tlie lower Kuban, where
the German withdrawal slowed down east
of Krasnodar in order to enable the
bridgehead to be consolidated. At pres-
ent the European troops are occupying
an area of about 2,000 square kilometers
around Novorossyisk, Anapa, and Tem-
ryuk, an area which was just recently
exposed to severe attacks. The future
will show whether the German High Com-
mand means to maintain this bridgehead
in spite of the difficulty of supplying it
across the Strait of Kertch.
A similar process to that on the north-
ern slopes of the Caucasus took place on
the left bank of the lower Don. Here,
likewise safeguarded by their comrades
fighting at Stalingrad, the German troops
withdrew in January along the railway
line KotelnikovoJSalskJRostov into the
Doneta area., after a part of them had
helped on the other side of the Don to
force back the southern spearhead of the
Reds who had broken through at Bogu-
tchar. They managed to surround some
of these Reds near Tatsinskaya on the
110
Likhaya/Stalingrad railway and destroy
them.
WITHDRAWAL 01' THE SECOND AlllIY
The German Bag over Stalingrad was
not lowered until the German Army
between the lower Don and the CaUC&8U8
had ca.rried out its maneuver with a
minimum of losses, while inflicting a
maximum of losses on the Reds. As
soon as it became clear that this ma-
neuver couId be eBected safely, those
troops, too, which had formed barrier
positions in the great Don Bend at
Millerovo and Tatsinskaya against the'
ROO pre88ure on the Donete basin, had
done their duty and couId be withdrawn.
In the 8000nd half of January, this region
wu also evacuated.
After the evacuation of the Don Bend,
the next in turn was the great square
KurskfVoronej fRossosh /Kharkov, held by
the German Second Army. It had been
captured in the summer of 1942 as a
jumping-off place towards the Don Bend
at the outset of the great German offen-
sive. In spite of numerous Soviet at-
tacb, it had been held until the end of
January to protect the flank of the
German Southern Army. Here, too, large
troop units were withdrawn during Jan-
uary under the protection of a rearguard.
At the end of January, between Roesosh
and Voronej, the Reds broke into this area
with m&8888 of troops released from
Stalingrad. According to their own re-
porte, their army was at least 100 divi-
sions strong here (Nomya Jim, 22.1.43).
The winter h&8 shown that, in those
places where the Germans decided to
offer resistance, the Soviets either did
not break through at all or did not get
very far. But here, as in the Caucuus
and in the Don Bend, the intention was
to give ground to the enemy. By
February 16 the entire region, including
the towns of Voronej, Kursk, Belgorod,
and Kharkov, had been evacuated.
THE GERMAN OOUNTEROFFENSIVE
Misinterpreting the situation and the
German strategy, the Soviet press and
the Allied camp were seized by a frenzy
of victory. They felt eeoure in the as-
8UDlption that the rapid adv:anoe of the
Red Army proved the annihilation of the
German Army. In their enthuaiaBm,
parts of the Red Army, among them
the Third Tank Army, stormed ahead
between Lisitchansk (on the middle
Donets) and Sevsk (northwest of Kursk)
towards the Dniepr and occupied Kramo-
armeisk (Grishino), Pavlograd, Krasno-
grad, Akhtyrka, Lebedin, and Sumy. The
Red and Anglo-Saxon press were already
dreaming of reaching the Dniepr and of
cutting off and destroying the right wing
of the German Army in the region north
of the Sea of Azov and the Crimea.
At this moment the German counter-
offensive began. Now it became evident
that the jubilant Soviet reports about
the collapse of the German armies. about
their inability to fight, let alone advance,
in the Russian winter, had been nothing
but wishful thinking. With incredible
force the German armies struck back,
conducting their main thrust from Stalino.
Like an iron fist they crt18hed the many
tentacles which the Soviets had stretched
out teward the Dniepr. There W&8 noth-
ing lacking in the punch the world had
learned to associate with the German
Army. The Soviets had to pay heavily
for their recklessness. Within a few days,
the Soviet army which had ventured too
far was destroyed or thrown back, and
the Mius/Donets front was re-establishod
&8 it had been in the spring of 1942.
Kharkov, the conquest of which Moecow
had celebrated as a second Stalingrad,
was rapidly retaken, and in the Kharkov-
Belgorod district alone nine infantry
divisions, four cavalry divisions, and
thirty-four motorized and tank brigades
of the Red Army were wiped out.
The Soviets, who had been trying
throughout the winter to ridicule the
German reports that their evacuation was
being carried out according to plan,
suddenly hogan to declare to the world
that they in turn had evacuated the
territory west of the Don according to
plan. Our map shows the area recon-
quered by the German counterthrust from
the Reds. On March 29 Berlin was able
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to announce that 1,350 occupied places,
among them 40 towns, had been retaken
by the Germans. Only Kursk and a
narrow area southwest of this town
remained in the hands of the .Rod8.
-- WEST OF MOSCOW
We have dealt in 8uch detail with the
events on the southern sector of the
Eastern Front because they were far
more dramatic than those in the north
and because it was here that the greatest
changes in occupation of territory took
place, changes which held a prominent
position in the imagination of newspaper
readers.
But it would be mistaken to 888ume
that the winter had paesed quietly in
the northern sector. This is not the
case. On the contrary, the Red com-
mand had, 88 was proved by the huge
concentration of tanks and planes, at first
intended to conduct the main thrust of
the winter offensive, not on the Don, but
to the west of Moscow. Stalin prob-
ably hoped by breaking through at this
spot-where already at the beginning of
the winter offensive his troops stood no
more than 400 kilometers from the Gulf
of Riga, Le., from the Baltic-to out off
the left flank of the German Army and,
by directly threatening German territory,
to force the entire center and right wing
of the Germans to flow back.
The Soviet offensive in this area began
one day later than that againat Stalingrad,
namely, on November 21. But here the
Red armies did not come np against
improvised positions which in part had
been occupied only a few weeks before
by the European armies, as was the case
on the southern front. Here they were
faced by a systematically fortified region,
whose main supports were Demyansk,
Velikiye Luki, and Rjev. The expected
success of this carefully prepared offen-
sive, carried out by the Soviets with vast
numbers of men, tanks, and planes, did
not materialize. It foundered on the
determination of the defenders who, in
contrast to the southern front, had orders
here not to let the enemy advance.
FAITHLESS ALLY
A further disadvantage for the Reds
was the fact that their great ally, "Gen-
eral Frost," left them in the lurch this
time. The entire territory through which
the Reds intended to attack here is
split up by watercourses and marshes,
which greatly facilitate the defense. The
offensive was started in the 888umption
that frost would bridge all these waters.
But the frost came later than expected
and thereby contributed towards bringing
the offensive to a standstill. In spite
of the utmost efforts and terrihle losses,
the two pillars of Demyansk and Rjev
remained unshaken. The only success
of this offensive, the capture of Velikiye
Luki, did not come until two months
later. By employing 13 infantry divi-
sions and 8 tank brigades, the Reds
succeeded early in January in cutting off
the German garrison of Velikiye Luki.
But even then it still held out for weeks
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before abandoning the town and fighting
its way through to the German lines.
Only in December, when the Soviets
realized their failure on this front, while
developments on the southern front
were more favorable to them, did Stalin
decide to throw to the south part of
the forces attacking west of Moscow
and the reserve army being held there.
This contributed towards tho success of
their break-through at Bogutchar. After
this, the ba.ttles in the sector west of
Moscow lost the wild, sanguinary charac-
ter they had had from the end of N0-
vembor to the end of December. Never-
theless, the German High Command-
although not before the beginning of
March-decided to shorten its linos
in this sector too. This movoment did
not take place under enemy pressure.
I t consisted of taking back the two
prongs of Demyansk and Rjev/&ly/
Vyazma which jutted deep into the
enemy positions. The front was with-
drawn to a line which runs in front of
the German strongholds of Staraya
Russa, Novo-Sokolniki, Nevel, Yartsevo,
Dorogobuj, and Oryol, thereby shorten-
ing it by more than 400 kilometers.
CORRIDOR ON LOGS
There is one more sector that we must
montion here: the front south of Lake
Ladoga. It was here that the Reds
conducted the last of their various
winter offensives. It was begun on Jan-
uary 12, simultaneously across the Vol-
khov westward in the direction of Lenin-
grad and from Leningrad eastward. Tho
land connection with Leningrad thereby
achieved was celebrated in the Soviet
and Allied press as a momentous ~ictory.
Yet, in order to arrive at a sober estima-
tion of this success, one must bear in
mind that the question, whether the
sacrifices made for the break-through
have boon worth the cost, can only be
answered in the ne",rt few months. During
the winter, just as in the winter of
1941/42, Leningrad was not blocked,
since the solidly frozen Lake Ladoga
made connections with the shore of the
lake occupied by the Reds possible. The
corridor which the Reds have captured
on the southern shore of the lake is,
according to their own claims, only a
few kilometers wide, and the railway line
that has been built there by laying logs
over the marshy area is in the direct line
of fire of the German artillery. The
warm season will not only free Lake
Ladoga from ice again but will also
transform its southern shore into a morass.
Only if the Soviets succeed in keeping the
corridor open in summer and in widening
it, will their offensive have been worth
while.
THE PRICE
Of great importance in judging the
balance of the winter war is the price
paid by both sides. In his speech on the
Heroes' Memorial Day, on March 21,
1943, Chancellor Adolf Hitler informed
the German people that it had to mourn
the dea.th of 542,000 fallen soldiers since
September 1939. On the basis of this
figure and those given by the German
High Command on July 2, 1942, and by
the FUhrer on November 9, 1942, the
German losses in men killed in action on
the Eastern Front are:
Summer and autumn 1941 162.000
Winter 1941/42 .. . . 89.000
Spring 1942 20.000
Summer and autumn 1942 29.000
Winter 1942/43 " • . . . 192.000
To these severe German losses must be
added those of the other European armios.
In the case of the Italians these wero
particularly heavy, for, according to
official figures released in Rome, they lost
6,700 dead and 72,000 missing on the
Eastern Front from January 1942 to
February 1943, most of them probably
during the battles of the past winter.
The troops of Italy, Rumania., Finland,
Hungary, Croatia, and the volunteer units
of almost all the peoples of Europe, in-
cluding those peoples under the Soviet
yoke, have contributed their share to
the achievements of the winter war.
Newspaper readers know how often the
German communiques have praised the
courage of Rumanian divisions; while
behind the terse statements of the
Finnish High Command stands the
brave, silent fight of a heroic nation
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on an exceptionally difficult battleground.
Special recognition is descrved by the
deeds of the sons of sunny Italy carried
out, far from their homes and with
great losscs, under the for them
particularly hard conditions of the
Russian winter.
For the sake of completeness we in-
clude the figures published on April 3,
1943, by the Soviet Information Bureau
regarding the alleged losses of the Euro-
pean armies, although these figures rep-
resent the customary exaggeration of
Soviet propaganda. According to these
claimR, the European armies are supposed
to have lost 850,000 dead and 343,585
prisoners in the course of the winter up
to March 31, 1943.
So far the Soviets have remained silent
on their own losses. But Berlin has
announced the following figures for Soviet
1088Cs, not counting prisoners. These
figures do not only show the monstrous
price paid by the Soviets during this
winter: they also throw an interesting
light on tho relative severity of fighting
























Russians than for the Axis powers."
(DNB, Geneva, 10.1.43.)
A SOBER VIEW
An interesting and sober estimation of
the winter campaign was given in the
London newspaper Evening Standard on
February 10, 1943 (Domei, Stockholm).
We quote from it here, not because we
believe the figures on the strength of the
Red Army to be reliable, but because the
article shows how oven Englishmen judge
the winter campaign when they rid
themselves of their wishful thinking:
At the start of the Soviet winter offensive, the
RUB8ilUUl had, on the vast front from Murmansk
to the Caucaaus region. 250 divisions. Behind
this line they had 80 divi~ions B8 reserves. whilo
200 more divisions were kept in reserve for use
in strategic encounters. Furthermore. there were
120 divisiollll of recruits undergoing training. In
short, it was obvious that Soviet RU88ia had an
army of 650 divisions to pitch against the Germana
when the winter offensive started.
The Germans wisely saw the situation and
apparently planned to wear down this enormous
army with as small a sacrifice as po88ible. The
RUB8ians have played into German inducement
tactics and thrown in not only the reeervee of the
second line but also the reeerves for strategio use.
During the paat nine months, the RUBsians have
boon suffering an average of 200,000 casualties a
month. The Soviet striking power has already
paased its climax, and there are signs that the
RU88ians are presently pressed with a dire shortage
of trained troops.
The Germans. on the other hand, have wisely
refrained from usurping their reserve troops and
shortened their defense lin811 in the most strategio
manner. while dealing heavy blows on the advano-
ing Soviets. With the arrival of spring. the Ger-
mans can throw their enormoUII reserve troops into
the front lines and launch a vigorous offensive
throughout the entire front.
According to the same Berlin report,
tho Red Army lost 1l,958 tanks and
3,763 planes in the course of the winter
battles. Consequently, the total number
of planes lost by the Soviets since June
22, 1941, amounts to 37,283, and that of
tanks to 34,000, figures that pass all
imagination and that show the gigantic
war preparation of the Soviot Union.
In January, Captain Cyril Falls, one of
England's best-known military writers and
the military commentator of the Time8,
wrote in tho Illustrated London News
that "the final result of the Russian
winter offensive will be costlier for the
STALIN VS. STANDLEY
In judging the winter war, we must
include considerations of a not purely
military nature.
Since the summor of 1941, the Russian
people and the Red Army have been
incited to continue their fight against
Europe by English and American prom-
ises of military and material aid. In
tho course of time this entire complex of
problems has narrowed down to the two
terms of "sccond front" and "lend-lease
aid." Apart from disputes over the
shaping of postwar Europe-which had
only the one practical significance of
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contributing towards opening the eyes
of many Europeans regarding the extent
of the danger threatening them in the
case of a Bolshevist and Anglo-Saxon
victory-the absence of the promised
large quantities of arms and of a second
front is the main reason for the none too
friendly relations between the Soviets
and their allies. Moscow's disappoint-
ment in both respects has grown to such
dimensions that we must, say a few words
about it.
For a long time it has been no secret
that the Soviets were extremely dis-
satisfied with the limited amount of
Anglo-American aid. But it was not
until 1808t autumn and winter that the
dissatisfaction simmering under cover
became apparent to all the world. The
two m08t prominent voices on this sub-
ject were a Bolshevist and an American
one.
On October 4, 1942, Stalin made the
following sharp deolaration in his letter
to an American journalist which was
published in the world pre88 :
Compu'ecI with &be help wbiola ... 80YW U"
ia .. t.he AI1iee by~ &be ....f~ &.be Qermu.l'ucia OIl benelf.
AWed help lot the Soviet Unioa _ Iv IItill
be. little effective. To expud and bet.... this
help, onJy one thing ia~: that the AlIi.
lulmJ their obliptioDli lulJy and puuctualJy. [For
IulJ text, _ our November 1942 u.ue, p. 370.)
With these oarefully formulated words,
Stalin made it very clear that his allies
were not living up to their commitments.
The opposite point of view was rep-
resented by the US Ambassador to the
USSR, Admiral W. H. Standley, when he
declared 00' March 9, 1943:
. The ~,·ieta _m to be trying to create the
tmpre88lOD at home and abroad that they are
fighting thia war alone, and t.bere _101I to be ..
deeire on I,heir part to make thinp ap~ .. if
they are fighting thi8 war with their ~~
alone without outaide aMiatanoe. Ever .moe I
~ve ~n hcre J have been looking lor recognition
m Sovtet paperll of the lact that they are getting
material help through us. not onJy through the
Jend·l_ aid agroementa, but through the Ameri·
can Red CI'08II .. well. I have failed, however.
to find any acknowledgement in the So';et ~.
Which of the two is right'?
WHAT AKBBIO.A. IS SENDING
There can be no doubt that America baa
sent a lot of war material to the Soviet
Union. Recently, the US Lend-Lease
Administrator, Edward S. Stettinius,
told the US Sonate that out of nine
billion dollars' worth of lend-lease de-
liveries up to Januat-y 31, 1943, the
USSR had been sent 1.3 billion dollars'
worth, or three million tons (TO, Lis-
bon, 2.3.43).
If one considers that the Soviets are
the only ones in the Allied camp who
have 80 far done any really large-scale
fighting, these figures appear modest
enough. But they are not surprising.
Neither in Washington nor in London is
there any true desire for a Soviet viotory.
Both are only trying to drag out the
present situation &8 long 88 JM*ible. •
situation in whioh Germaay and the
Soviet Union are fightiDg ..,h other
while the Anglo-Am.ican foroee are
being spared. Con8equently, only that
amoam of war material has been sent
to the SoTtete that W88 absolutely neoes-
sary to keep them from collapsing entirely.
• •• AND WHAT THE USSR GETS
Still, one could say: 3 millioo tons of
war material are not to be sneezed at.
But here the 8ubmarines of the Axis
powers have a word to say. The world
knOW8 that one million tons after another
of enemy shipping haa fallen victim to
them. Thus it is hardly amazing that
American politicians usually end their
proud speeches about the large shipments
to the USSR with 8uoh meek sentences
68 "Not all of our shipments arrive"
(Roosevelt, 12.12.42), or "Part of what
we have sent baa been l08t on the way"
(Stettinius. 21.1.43).
.As regards the shortest route from the
USA to the USSR, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Admiral Alexander, made this
gloomy statement:
Each convoy directed alontl the northern route
to R~.. hae lIO lar t-l aubjeC.'t to violent enemy
air and U·boat attackl in that part of the route
which i. more difficult to protect, and .hippinJ
l~ in t~ operations have been considerable.
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At the same time he admitted the loss
of two cruisers, throe destroyers, one
submarine, and throe minesweepers in
these waters (Stefani, Rome, 23.11.42).
Admiral Alexander's words were em-
phasized by a Berlin report (10.12.42) to
the effect that, since September 1942, no
Allied convoy had gone to Murmansk
and that during this period altogether
only three shipe, one of them in a severely
damaged condition, had reached Mur-
mansk from the Atlantic. (And yet
winter, with its almost continuous night,
was the most favorable time for convoys
to risk traveling over the waters at the
northern end of Europe which are domi-
nated by German planes and U-boats.)
On the same day the Leningrad radio
reported that the harbor of Arkhangelsk:-
next to Murmansk the largest port on
the north coast of Russia-was frozen
over. Hence the supplies of war material
for the Red Army were limited chiefly
to the enormous detour via Persia. But
even this route suffered from severe
108888 in tonnage, owing to the vigilance
of the Axis submarines. Finally, part of
the supplies reached the Red Army via
Vladivostok.
Neither the Anglo-Americans nor the
SovieUi have published figures on the
quantities of lend-lease material that
have actually reached the Soviet Union.
Tho Anglo-Americans have not' done 80
because it is their policy to conceal their
108.'l68 in tonnage, the Soviets because
they wish thereby to indicate that these
supplies have so far been-in the words
of the Soviet writer llya Ehrenburg-
CIa drop in the ocean" which was not
worth talking about.
However, we have the testimony of
German 80ldiers to the effect that the
Anglo-American armament aid has so
far scarcely been noticeable on the
Eastern Front. Every few days German
report8 from the Eastern Front point out
that the enemy tanks met in battle are
almost exclusively of Soviet manufacture.
The absence of Anglo-American arms in
large numbers proves, it is true, that
the Soviets have an armament production
more gigantic than hardly anyone would
have believed possible; but it does not
contribute towards enhancing the love of
the Russians for their allies. Since the
Stalin declarapon mentioned above, the
Russians have been constantly pl'088ing
for increased aid.
"A.FTER YOU, PLEASE"
Moscow has never recognized the Anglo-
American invasion of North Africa as a
second front and has in recent months
again strongly emphasized its desire
for a real BOCond front. One of the
propagandistic means of pressure in this
direction was the oft-repeated Soviet
claim that the Germans had transferred
80 many divisions from western Europe
to the east in the course of the winter
that there was hardly anything to prevont
the establishment of a second front.
On February 3, for instance, Tass re-
ported that 11 divisions had already
arrived in RU88ia from western Europe
and that another 9 were on the way.
On March 3, the Soviets spoke of 31
divisions, and these speculations were
crowned by a long article about the second
front appearing on April 3 in a Shanghai
Soviet paper. We quote:
Only 12 German divisions have remained to
protect the cout and occupied Europe. EYeD if
". allow for an error of eeveral division. in OW'
oaloulatioD8, one can reckOD that, f<n the protectioa
apiJYt an Analo·American landing, certainly no
more than 20 German divWi0n8 are left.
While the Soviets are thus deluding
themselves and trying to force their
dangerous illusions upon their alliee, in
order to show them what child's play
the establishment of a second front
would be, they keep on hearing from
London and Washington that the second
front is an extremely difficult undertaking
and should not be expected too 800n.
Cyril FaJIa, whom we have quoted before,
put this viewpoint into a very typical
form. Not only did he say that "the
invasion would cost hundreds of thou-
sands of casualties and at the present
moment would not even decide the
war," but he added words which, in the
ears of the battered Red Army at the
end of iUi greatest eftort, must have
sounded bitter if not actually mocking.
Captain Falls told the RU88ians that "a
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large-scale invasion of Europe must coin-
cide with Soviet 8UCOO8868 on the Eastern
Front." In other word8, the Soviet
winter offensive, of which Moscow boasted
80 much, is not regarded by him &8 a
sufficiently groat success to jU8tify an
invasion. And even for the future he
does not expect an invasion to be success-
ful "unless the Soviets score gigantic
successes." (CPS, 2.4.43.)
Thus, instead of a second front, the
RUBSians are presented by t heir allies
with the cynical request, first to produce
gigantic successes of their ow n.
Under these oircumstances, can there
be any cause for surprise if the Russian
people feel a growing disgus t for their
allies and also increasing don bt in their
own leaders, who are driving millions of
Russians to their deaths! It could only
be a question of time before this disgust
and the yearning for the end of the
hopeless war solidified into a tendency
directod against Stalin.
GENERAL VLASSOV
On March 17. 1943. the anti-Bolshevist
newspaper Zarya, which appears in
Smolensk. published an open letter signed
by a certain Lieut. General Andrey
Andreyevitch V1assov. The contents
were something as follows :
Stalin hu involved RUIIIIia in a war eei'ving
Britain'. and America'. imporialilltio iDtereete.
which are absolutely alien to the Ru.1rian fOOple.
Moreover, in IIllrving these intereete, Stalm hu
IIOeD a ~bility of realizing his own upirationa
for world rule. It i. for this roa8On that he h..
linked up the fate of tho RUSllian pea pie with that
of the British. Thus. owing to St alin. all the
mieery whioh the people of the Soviet Union have
been Bufforing during the laat twen ty.five bitter
Y-J'B h.. been climaxed by the m illfortunea of
tbill war.
Thia roaaoning must lead to the oonclwdon that
Bolahevism in gunera1 and Stalin in particular
are tho chief enemies of the RWIIIian peoplo. Thu.
the only thing to do is to overthrow the Bo1abeviat
regime, put an end to the bloodshed in this war
that i. not neceBll8J'y for the RWlllian people but
is being waged for foreign interesta alone. and build
up a new Ru8Bia. Thia t8IIk of the Rusaian people
can be 80Ived only iD union with Germany and
with the aid of the Gennan people. Today.. in
the put, the intel'Ollte of the RUSllian people coin.
cide with thoae of the German people u weU ..
with thoae of the remaining oountritlll of Europe.
Bolabeviam alone haa IIeparated the RUSllian people
by an insurmountable wall from Europe.
Such ideas have been voiced before.
Why did they ca\Ul8 a world sensatiOD
this timet Who is VI888ov!
CAREER OF A BOLSHEVIK
The biography of the Lieutenant Gen-
eral reads like that of an ideal Bolshevik.
The 80n of a Feasant in the province of
Nishny-Novgorod on the middle Volga,
he was born in 1901. .At tho outbreak
of the Bolshevist Revolution he was
just sixteen, and thereafter grow up
entirely a product of Bolshevism. In
1919 he entered the Red Army as a
private and worked his way up to the
rank of an officer. Ho became a member
of the Communist Party, received a
number of high Soviet docorations, served
in 1938/3988 a military adviser to Chiang
Kai-shek, and distinguished himself in
the present war in the fighting at Kiev.
Moscow. and" Leningrad. BO that he was
finally entrusted with tho command of
the Second Shock Army, which was to
break through on the Volkbov.
The important fact about General
VI.BIOv is that he is not an emigrant and
a traditional opponent of the Soviet
regime. but its son who, as he has de-
clared himself. has suffered no wrong
from this regime. And it is from among
the Russians who have lived through
twenty-five years of Bolshevism that a true
change of the Russian people must come.
It was the experience of this war which
changed Vlaasov's attitude towards Bol-
shevism. The terrible sacrifices in lives
which the Russian people had to hear at
Stalin's command gave him more and
more food for thought. And the ruthless
sacrificing of the Second Shock Army led
to his broak with Bolshevism and to the
convictions quoted above. His open lot-
ter goes on to say:
With theee ideu, with this I'ft;olve. I was tokell
prisoner in the recent. fighting together with a
handful of loyal men. I "pent more than sjx
months iD • camp for prisonen of war. Not only
did I not change my rerolve under prieon.comp
conditiona, but my conviction has becomo eV(\D
flnner.
On a baai, of honor and siDcere conviction, in
the full conacioumeA of raponsibility towanJ my
country, my people. and history, for what I have
done, 1 call upon tile people to fight, setting myself
the task of founding a new RU8Bia. It is not for
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• retum to the pll8t that I appeal to the people.
No, I call upon it for a happy future, to fight for
tho completion of the national revolution, to fight
for tho OfItabliahment of a new RU88ial
Since neither Stalin nor Bolshevism is fighting
for RU811ia. it is the duty of every RUlIIIian to join
the rWIj,. of the anti·Bo18hevist movement aKain8t
Stalin, for peace, Bnd for a new Ru88ia.
ST. ANDREW'S CROSS
Jmmcdiately upon the publication of
General Vlassov's open lotter, a "Com-
mittee for the Liberation of Russia" was
founded, which was joined by a number
of Soviet genElrals taken prisoner, among
them Major General W. F. Malyshkin.
Vlassov himself is the chairman of the
Committee and the leader of the "Army
of Liberation," "'hieh is made up of
former prisoners of war and whose coat
of arms is a St. Andrew's cross on a blue,
white, and red background. Parts of
the new army are already on the Eastern
Front.
It is understandable that a man like
Vlassov first appeared openly among
the prisoners of war. It has been hard
to find Vlassovs in the fighting ranks of
the Red Army so far, because they were
"liquidated" long before anyone heard
of them. Moreover, most officers of the
Red Army stand far too much under the
terrible pressure of the war and of Bol-
shevist terror and propaganda to 00 able
to come to their 86DB68. Tho leaders of
the Red Army, being as they are the
products of the Bolshevist Revolution,
have for the last twenty-five years been
living under a tension that can hardly
be imagined in any other nation. The
prison camp offers many of them their
first opportunity to think for themselves.
Vlassov is perhaps not important as a
person, but he is important as a symptom.
Millions of Russions are prisoners of
war. The contrast between life as they
knew it in the Soviet Union and life in
Europe, even in a prison ca.mp, has
provided them with much food for
thought, and there must be many
Vlassovs in their ranks.
A Shanghai Soviet paper tried to scoff
at the Vlassov case by asking ironically,
why this Vlassov needed six months to
come out into the open with his ideas.
In other words, it considers six months-
a suspiciously long time. To us this-
seems to point to the contrary. ]f
Soviet generals, who have lived all their
livos under Bolshevism and have never
seen the world except through Red
glasses, turned against Stalin on the day
after their capture, they would appear
very suspicious to the Germans and would
be regarded as dangerous opportunists or
even as agents provocaieunJ.
WIULE THE DAYS GROW LONGER
As we go to press, "General Mud" has
enforced a temporary cessation of largo-
scale operations along the Eastern Front.
The winter battle is over, aud both sides
are preparing for the summer. This
pa.use between battles calls for an estimate
of the position and strength of tho
oppononts.
As far as the course of tho front is
concerned, the situation is abont the same
as it was a year a.go. The Soviets have
an advantage in that they now possess
their corridor to Leningrad and have
reoccupied the German salients at
Demyansk and Rjev, as well as the
district of Kursk; the Germans by the
fact that, in contrast to tho previous
year when the enemy held tho world's
strongest fortress, Sevastopol, and the
Kertch Peninsula, they now have a firm
hold on the entire Crimea and possess a
bridgehead on the lower Kuban.
With regard to numerical strength, the
Red Army has until now been greatly
superior. The three main reasons for
this are: (I) the population of tho
USSR was on June 22, 1941, about 50
per cent larger than that of Germany
and Italy combined; (2) the Soviet Union
has been in a state of total mobilization
since tho autumn of 1941 and has ruth-
lessly exploited every ounce of her
strength, while Germany, as a result of
her experience in gaining the ovorwhelm-
ing victorics of 1939/41 with relatively
small armics and because sho undor-
ostimated the fighting capacity of the
USSR, long refrainod from such measures;
(3) the European armies have to guard
all the frontiers of Europe, from the
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North Cape to the Pyronees and Crete,
while the USSR can concentrate almost
all its armed forces on its western front.
Of these three reason, only the third
one has remained valid. The first two
have changed radically.
As rega,rda (1), the human losses of the
USSR have been incomparably greator
than those of the European armies. Not
only has it lost vast numbers of its
population owing to the German advance
deep into its territory: it has also suffered
losses on the battlefield which are un-
paralleled in history. In the two summer
offensives of 1941 and 1942, the Germans
deprived the Red Army of millions of
soldiers at a relatively small cost to
themselves. On the other hand, the
Reds achieved the territorial gains of
their two winter offensives at a terrific
price. They used the same method over
and over again: they drove huge numbers
of their men against the positions of the
enemy in order to crush them even at
the cost of gigantic losses to themselves.
As regards (2), when the first winter
battle had shown a year ago the magnitude
of the task of destroying Bolshevism,
Germany changed her man-power policy.
She started on the road of total mobiliza-
tion, a policy which reached its peak in
the legislation of the Stalingrad days.
On April 10 a remarkable report came
out of Germany telling the story of the
so-called "Unruh Army" (named after
General von UIU'uh, who is in charge of
the mobilization of German lUan power).
This report includes the sensational state-
ment: "During the last six months,
almost as many new soldiers have been
trained in Germany as made up the
whole German Army before."
Thus it is safe to say that, dW'illg the
l\pproaching ummel', the difference be-
twoon the numerical strength of the
Soviet and European annie will be
smaller than at any time sinoe the start
of the war. The spring of the German
military machine which was uncoiled
during the huge expansion of the 8ummer
of 1942 has been rewound during the
winter. It has regained its dynamic
power and will shortly be ready to lash
out anew.
~he young cavalry officer von Wedell, a fa.vorite. of Frederick ~he
Great's had been killed in battle. On heanng thIS news, the Kmg
rode aimlessly about the battlefield in agony of mind. "Wedell.
Wedell!" he shouted, as t.hough by his cries he could recall the
young hero to life.
A corporal lying among a heap of dead and wounded heard ~he
King shouting thus and, ma~ing a last effort,. sat up ~~d said:
"Your Majesty, there are nothmg but Wedells lymg here I
The King halted his horse, gazed at the dying man for som~
time, and said: "You have taught me a good lesson. I thank you.
